Four significant reads of the last two weeks:
1. Robert George's wonderfully well-written piece in the New Republic on the reasons that he -- a serious third-wave movement conservative -- could not vote for George Bush.
2. Marshall Wittman's article on the reasons he -- a serious movement conservative of the McCain faction, and an advocate for the long-abandoned concept of "national-greatness conservatism" -- will not vote for George Bush.
3. Benjamin Wallace-Wells's superb article on the self-destruction of the Republican party, in the Washington Monthly
4. The ongoing internal debates of Daniel Drezner, Andrew Sullivan and other independent conservatives as they come to terms with voting for Kerry.
Two weeks before the election, it is too easy to read these texts only through the lens of whether they might have some impact on the election. But that's not the point. Even if 10% of the New Republic's 100,000 readers are genuinely undecided, what are the chances that they all live in Florida and Ohio?
But taken together, these articles prove that one outcome is no longer left to be decided in November: Even if Bush is reelected by a sizable margin, the intellectual enterprise known as modern American conservatism has been utterly shattered and bankrupt. This is not Bush's achievement alone, but the Republican Congress's as well, the result of a long era of decadence and self-dealing that began with conservatism's triumph in 1994.
For the last several years, liberals have bemoaned the idea that conservatives seemed to have a coherent, relatively simple philosophy: small government, low taxes, free trade, strong defense but non-interventionist foreign policy. But what is left of conservatism now except tax cuts, especially tax cuts that benefit particular financial interests? Tax cuts are not conservatism. They are not a coherent worldview. They were a part of the conservative philosophy, but not an end in themselves. Stripped out of the larger framework of smaller government, of modesty about the possibilities of change, of respect for tradition and history, and of the sense that central government can be oppressive as easily as it can be liberating, tax cuts amount to nothing more than a material benefit for a few, and a long-term liability for everyone else. Put another way, imagine that the animating ideas of liberalism were reduced to this promise: "We will create a new cabinet-level agency every single year." That's not a vision that can attract deep loyalty, and neither is the promise of a tax cut every year.
If Bush loses, serious conservatives, with the possible exception of extreme social conservatives, will have to ask themselves what they gained from four years of unfettered power, and ten years of domination of American politics. Government is "bigger" by every measure, and more intrusive. A pet idea, Social Security privatization, was actually discredited by their president's incompetence. Younger voters are increasingly turned off by the social conservatism, so the movement is not expanding its base. A huge new entitlement was created. The federal role in education expanded. And poor planning and dishonesty over Iraq weakened our defense, our credibility, and made it impossible to set a clear standard for when we would intervene and when not.
All the tax cuts have done is to postpone the day we pay for these things.
And if Bush wins, all this will still be true. Especially after a vicious campaign that offered no clear and persuasive conservative vision, it will be no easier for Bush to enact a conservative mandate. The corrupt short-term political bargains will only continue. If Bush wins, Karl Rove may be deemed a tactical genius, but the chances of a significant ideological realignment of American politics are lower than at any time since 2000. A smart conservative would surely prefer Bush to lose, if only to get the long process of intellectual rebuilding started right away.
For non-conservatives, is this cause for celebration? Unfortunately, it is not. First, the meltdown of conservatism is not the same as the resurgence of liberalism. In many bizarre and ironic ways, Bush-DeLayism has managed to equally discredit the idea of an active government in a way that will damage any effort to restore it in the future. When seniors get through figuring out the Medicare law, are they going to want to hear about yet another government program? And when President Kerry has to fight like hell to raise taxes, for no purpose other than to reduce the deficit and perhaps buy some time before the employer-based health system collapses, people won't feel they are getting any benefit from their higher taxes. How are they going to feel about government then?
Second, even if there were a resurgence of liberalism, our country still needs a healthy, responsible conservatism. Brad deLong has often argued that it's healthy to have liberal governments that expand programs and spending balanced by conservative ones that bring that spending under control. I think there's a case for that. But fiscal policy is not the whole story.
The various conservative apostates all define conservatism in their own ways. Marshall Wittman feels the betrayal of "National Greatness Conservatism," an idea which many of its better-known promoters, such as David Brooks and William Kristol, seem to have merely flirted with and which really has more in common with turn-of-the-last-century progressivism. Robert George defines conservatism as small government and "accountability in government," arguing that Bush-DeLayism has hurt both causes. True, but the right has no particular claim to accountability in government. Most progress toward greater accountability -- such as sunshine laws, FOIA, campaign finance reform, civil service -- has come from the left or from centrist reformers.
It surprising to me that these conservatives seem to miss one of the most distinctive contributions of conservatism: not just "small government" but its urging to be modest about the degree to which human behavior can be modified by law or other collective decisions, and to be respectful of the role that tradition, custom, religion, greed, etc. play in all of human life. I've always liked Senator Moynihan's aphorism: ""The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself."
Bush-DeLayism's greatest betrayal of conservatism is in its rejection of this modesty about social scheming. Because of its corruption and incompetence, their practice has consisted of ever more complicated schemes of incentives and penalties to change behavior: No Child Left Behind, for example, whose main flaw is not that its underfunded, but that it tries to micromanage local schools through pokes and prods from a set of rules set in Washington. The Medicare bill and the Bush health plans, which attempt to incentivize one thing or another, and are horribly contrived even if you believe that the combination of Health Savings Accounts and catastrophic plans will improve American health care and not destroy it. The various contrivances of the "Ownership Society." And, of course, the grand vision of democracy in the Middle East, which the White House seems to have stumbled into in spite of Bush's vow of "humility" in foreign policy, and would now like to get out of.
Of all the conservative thinkers out there, including many such as George Will who are deeply rooted in this Burkean tradition, I have not seen any who have shown much understanding of this betrayal. The exception is a writer who I have sometimes given a hard time, Anne Applebaum of the Washington Post. Her column a couple weeks ago, "'Ownership Society' or Snake Oil?"
seemed the clearest expression of this strain of conservative caution and respect. This is the aspect of conservatism that I believe will be most missed in the wake of its intellectual bankruptcy.
I recognize, though, that I am not a conservative, and have about as much right to offer my opinion about what American conservatives should think or say as I do about whether the Catholic mass should be in Latin or English. But I've learned a lot from conservative writing and thinking, and I am very serious in believing that we will be worse off without its insights.