Did the Iranians Burn Chalabi? Were they trying to help us?

Today's Financial Times carried a fascinating letter by John Brady Kiesling, the U.S. diplomat who resigned eloquently during the run-up to the Iraq war.

Kielsing's letter looks like compressed version of an op-ed. It would be great to have the full-length version, because there is a lot here. In short, Kiesling suggests that the Iranians deliberately revealed Ahmed Chalabi's dual role, and in doing so, helped free the U.S. to manage the transition in Iraq without the disastrous influence of Chalabi.

...Iran's Baghdad intelligence chief incriminated Mr Chalabi as an Iranian informant, transmitting Mr Chalabi's alleged revelations via the very communications link Mr Chalabi had just told him the US could intercept.

It is safest to assume that this gaffe was deliberate: the Iranians exploited the US's allergy to Iran to neutralise a shared problem. The leak ended a disastrous 18-month stalemate during which Paul Bremer, the US administrator, had been unable to impose a coherent Iraqi reconstruction policy, because Mr Chalabi had the Washington connections to thwart most concessions to Iraqi reality.

The Chalabi fiasco underscores, paradoxically, that Iran is the US's necessary partner in Iraq. Iranians see a defanged, stable, unified Iraq as a national interest worth considerable toil and treasure - preferably the US's rather than their own - to achieve. Iranians enjoyed America's floundering in Iraq, but only up to a point. Mr Chalabi may have promised the Iranians the moon, but the Iranians knew he was no more trustworthy as their partner than as the US's.....

President George W. Bush's lack of curiosity about Saddam Hussein's Iraq proved catastrophic to all concerned.

This seems credible to me, even though it's so bizarre that you almost expect Arvin Sloane to suddenly appear as the mastermind behind all this.